HIV/AIDS in Africa by Joireman, Sandra F.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
2006
HIV/AIDS in Africa
Sandra F. Joireman
University of Richmond, sjoirema@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joireman, Sandra F. "HIV/AIDS in Africa." In Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters, edited by Donald S. Rothchild and Edmond J.
Keller, 147-65. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
7 
HIV/AIDS in Africa 
SANDRA F. jOIREMAN 
T he response of the United States to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa is an example of the redefined nature of security threats that character-
izes the post-September 11 period. Even the most ardent realists now accept 
that serious threats exist to US security apart from those brewing in organ-
ized states. Scholars and governments have been forced to adopt a greater 
sensitivity to the issues that underlie international violence and terrorism, 
such as a lack of political freedom, state failure, poverty, and HIV/AIDS, 
the topic addressed in this chapter as an indirect threat to US security inter-
ests in Africa. I 
The US response to HIV/AIDS in Africa reflects the way in which 
Africa fits into the US national security agenda. Although increased aware-
ness of the causes of terrorism has made Africa more critical to the national 
security agenda of the United States than it has been in the past, the African 
security concerns of greatest interest to US policymakers are terrorism and 
state failure. But a state cannot stand when great numbers of its peoples are 
decimated by disease. HIV I AIDS shares three similarities with poverty as a 
contributing factor to state failure. Both are regionalized, are temporally 
less immediate, and address human security insofar as they affect interna-
tional security. 
For the most part, African states do not pose a direct political threat to 
US security interests. The United States neither faces strong ideological 
enemies on the African continent nor engages in the kind of proxy wars that 
characterized the Cold War. With the recent opening of Libya to 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, the actual national security 
threats to the United States from African governments are relatively few. 
However, economic underdevelopment, coupled with HIV/AIDS, may pro-
duce an environment in which weak or even failed states are unable to stem 
the growth of terrorist groups within their borders-groups that may or may 
not be linked up to international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida or 
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' Islamic Jihad. Moreover, other threats to US security occasionally material-
ize in states unable to adequately police their own borders and assert state 
control outside the capital. An excellent example of just such a threat was 
the recent attempt to illegally export uranium from the Democratic Republic 
ofCongo.2 
HIV/AIDS is a security threat, but it is indirect and played out at multi-
ple levels of analysis: within individual bodies; clustered within families 
and communities, wreaking havoc on their ability to cope with the day to 
day challenges ofliving; and with destabilizing effects on the state.3 It is the 
pervasiveness of the disease and the lack of treatment that multiplies its 
effect to the point that it becomes a security issue for states. Through the 
challenges it creates within those states, it emerges as an international secu-
rity issue. Thus, HIV/AIDS links human security and international security 
in unique ways. AIDS is a disease; it is neither a weapon nor a state.4 Yet it 
has been perceived by two US administrations as a threat to national securi-
ty because of its potential for destabilizing states. This fact is worthy of 
note: it is the first time that a disease has been interpreted as a national 
security threat. 
After a brief description of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, I identi-
fy the development of HIV/AIDS as a perceived security threat and detail 
the specific security issues presented by HIV I AIDS in Africa. Then, I 
explore the li'nkages between national security and the recently passed 
"Global AIDS Bill." Last, I discuss the divergence of perspectives between 
African states and the United States regarding the threat of HIV/AIDS. I 
then make some observations regarding the future of HIV I AIDS as a securi-
ty threat in Africa and the development of the "next" wave of HIV/AIDS in 
South Asia. 
The HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa 
Africa remains the continent most affected by HIV/AIDS. Eighty-one per-
cent of the world's AIDS-related deaths occur in sub-Saharan Africa.5 The 
prevalence of AIDS (7.5-8.5 percent of the total population) is higher in 
sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world. An estimated 2.4 mil-
lion adults and children died from AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005.6 At 
least 2 million adults are infected in Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and 
Nigeria, and one in four adults have contracted the virus in Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.7 Furthermore, most of the 
world's women suffering from the AIDS virus-a shocking 83 percent-
live in sub-Saharan Africa.s 
On the African continent, HIV infection rates are not similar in all 
countries and all areas. The World Health Organization divides the conti-
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nent up ·into regions; of these, southern Africa suffers the most, with its 
prevalence rates rising from 20.3 percent in 1997-1998 to 25.7 percent in 
2001-2002. These percentages may result from the higher levels of urban-
ization found in southern Africa. East Africa's prevalence rate has decreased 
slightly, from a high of 13.7 percent to 11.4 percent, which is partially 
attributable to the significant and consistent HIV I AIDS awareness cam-
paign by the Ugandan government. This trend has been followed by other 
countries in the region, most notably Ethiopia, where in the capital of Addis 
Ababa HIV prevalence rates for fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old pregnant 
women dropped from 24 percent in 1995 to 11 percent in 2003,. The AIDS 
prevalence in West Africa has fallen slightly from 4.4 percent in 1999-2000 
to 3.1 percent in 2003-2004.9 
It is important to unpack these statistics in order to understand the 
nature of the epidemic and how it affects different countries. We can do that 
by looking at three "snapshots" of African countries dealing with 
HIV/AIDS: Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia. I have chosen these three 
because they are all politically stable, not currently at war, and at very dif-
ferent points in terms of the response to the pandemic and its prevalence 
within their borders. 
Uganda 
Uganda was one of the first African countries to experience the full impact 
of HIV I AIDS. At the height of the epidemic, infection rates were 14 percent 
throughout the country and much higher in some areas.10 Now HIV infec-
tion rates are down to 8 percent because most of the people infected earlier 
have died. Uganda has experienced the peculiar demographic challenge of 
HIV/AIDS; for example, the virus attacks people who are most sexually 
active and most economically productive (those between t_he ages of fifteen 
and forty-five). Uganda has suffered from a lack of teachers and medical 
professionals as a result of the epidemic. Thus the virus kills the population 
most necessary to development: the teachers, doctors, and entrepreneurs as 
well as the mothers and fathers raising children. In Uganda, high rates of 
the HIV/AIDS infection corresponded with conflict and instability in the 
country. As peace came in the mid-1980s, fewer people were displaced, sol-
diers and rebels returned to their barracks and hometowns, and infection 
rates began to decline. Uganda also embraced the challenge of reducing 
infection rates and launched a national educational campaign against 
HIV/AIDS beginning in 1986. The slogan of "Abstinence, Be Faithful, or 
Use a Condom"-often referred to as the ABC method-succeeded in get-
ting across the message of safe sexual practices. The Ugandan model of 
HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness has been widely applauded and has 
shown significant results. President Yoweri Museveni supported the educa-
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tional campaign and articulated it from the capital city to the classrooms in 
rural schools. 
South Africa 
South Africa has the most HIV-positive people of any country in the world. 
It is at the peak rate for new infections, and little headway has yet been 
made to bring the infection rate down. Of South Africa's 45 million people, 
5.3 million are infected with HIV,11 and 25 percent of its economically 
active individuals are infected.12 The staggering toll that AIDS is taking on 
South Africa's social and economic fabric has only recently been acknowl-
edged by the government. By 2000, the government began an AIDS preven-
tion and treatment program, but it has been widely criticized for its ineffec-
tiveness. In 2000, South Africa's ministry of health refused to provide 
antiretroviral treatment for cost reasons, and President Thabo Mbeki pub-
licly questioned whether HIV really caused AIDS.13 By 2002, the govern-
ment began to work more closely with nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and promoted limited antiretroviral use. South Africa's government 
will face a growing crisis as AIDS patients clog its health infrastructure and 
the number of AIDS orphans grows. 
Ethiopia 
Like the South African government, the Ethiopian government was slow to 
recognize the impact that HIV/AIDS could have on its country and was late 
to begin education and prevention programs. Throughout the 1990s, 
Ethiopia faced an in~reasing number of deaths from tuberculosis but failed 
to link these deaths to opportunistic infections resulting from HIV/AIDS. 
Under pressure from indigenous NGOs and international organizations, the 
situation began to change in 1999. Ethiopia now recognizes that it has a 
struggle ahead in terms of its efforts to cope with HIV/AIDS. Recently, it 
began a significant effort to educate the population on the basics of virus 
transmission. However, significant challenges remain, as surveys show that 
young people have a lot of misconceptions about the disease, particularly in 
the rural areas.14 A recently established government office, the National 
HIV/AIDS Council, has not yet been as effective as it could be in focusing 
attention and resources on the disease. One of the biggest challenges for 
Ethiopia will be how to deal with the AIDS orphans in the next decade. By 
some estimates, AIDS could orphan up to a quarter of all children in 
Ethiopia by 2011.15 These orphans will challenge the state's ability to pro-
vide education and jobs and will also drain a healthcare system that current-
ly spends only $2 per year per citizen.16 
These snapshots give some indication of the varied nature of the 
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HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. It is everywhere a challenge to the state and 
to fragile health care systems, but different countries are at different stages 
of their response to HIV/AIDS. Muslim areas and states have generally 
been less affected by HIV/AIDS, and West African average rates of infec-
tion have been lower than those in southern and East Africa (see Appendix 
at end of chapter). 
The Evolution of HIV/AIDS as a Perceived Security Threat 
HIV/AIDS has existed as an epidemiological challenge on the African con-
tinent since the 1970s. From the 1980s onward, the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
was recognized as a humanitarian crisis and an issue of human security. 
International responses occurred primarily through NGO activity and inter-
national institutions tasked with health care, such as the World Health 
Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and to some 
extent the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. Yet it was not 
discussed in policy circles as a security threat until 1994, when · 
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth note.ct the risks to 
state stability that develop in countries. seriously affected by AIDS.17 It was 
not until 2000 that HIV/AIDS became more widely recognized as a security 
threat. At that time the full impact of the disease on state capacity became 
apparent to external observers.IS In 2000, the Clinton administration 
requested $250 million in its 2001 budget to fight the global AIDS pandem-
ic.19 The administration saw HIV/AIDS as a threat to the fledgling democ-
racies on the African continent. It also commented on the, possibility of 
AIDS contributing to failed states because of the state's inability to provide 
security, health care, and education.20 
What makes AIDS more than just an epidemiological crisis? Why has it 
made the leap from disease to a security issue? I answer these questions in 
the following section by examining the security concerns resulting from 
HIV/AIDS at the national and international levels. Certainly, HIV/AIDS is a 
threat to individual or human security: I show how the deaths of many indi-
viduals have turned HIV/AIDS into a national and international security 
threat. 
African National Security Interests 
The greatest immediate security threat from HIV/AIDS infection at a 
national level is that which comes from the weakening of the military when 
a significant percentage of soldiers become infected with HIV/AIDS. If the 
HIV infection rate keeps pace with other sexually transmitted diseases, the 
threat to the military is considerable. Stefan Elbe has noted, "Prevalence 
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rates of sexually transmitted diseases among military personnel usually 
exceed those of the civilian population by a factor of two to five. In many 
African militaries, this is also true with regard to HIV."21 In some countries, 
the rates of HIV infection among the military are estimated to be as high as 
50 to 60 percent.22 The number of infected soldiers in any given army is dif-
ficult to determine, and governments are understandably reluctant to make 
this information public, even if they do know it with some certainty. 
According to Robert L. Ostergard, "the public admission of what may be 
high HIV infection rates among military personnel potentially compromises 
national and military security for some states by revealing what could be a 
substantial weakness in the military's combat readiness."23 Even though 
states thus have good reason to underestimate the rate of HIV infection in 
their military, some data do exist. The Appendix at the end of this chapter 
records the results of a concerted attempt to collect available infection rate 
data among military personnel in Africa. 
High rates of HIV infection in the military increase the amount of 
money that needs to be devoted to recruitment, training, and health care. 
Just as AIDS eliminates some of the most useful segments of the civilian 
population, so too does it have a significant impact on the officer corps and 
command structure of the armed forces. The training that goes into the 
preparation of a single soldier is lost when he or she is affected by 
HIV/AIDS and has to leave the armed forces. The average cost of training 
per soldier increases overall when more recruits have to be trained to com-
pensate for those who have to leave the army due to HIV.24 Moreover, that 
particular soldier will not move up through the ranks and be available for 
leadership oppprtunities or lend his battlefield experience to the force. The 
end result of high rates of HIV infection will be a less experienced and 
therefore less prepared armed force than one in which the rates are substan-
tially lower. Recognizing the high costs of training and frequent turnover, 
the Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan armed forces in Africa have made 
HIV testing mandatory for recruits. These countries then systematically 
exclude those who test positive.25 
If we can call the issue of HIV infection among soldiers the primary 
threat to national security, the secondary and linked threat is the soldier as a 
vector of HIV transmission among the population. Zimbabwe's army is an 
example. By some estimates, the army from the late 1980s to 1990 was 
more than 70 percent HIV-positive.26 These Zimbabwean forces were 
deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s, undoubtedly 
spreading the disease there. Such a high percentage of infected soldiers may 
be unusual, but the scenario is not. Indeed, it is thought that the war in 
Angola exacerbated the spread of HIV/AIDS globally in the 1970s and that 
soldiers were the original vectors of the disease.27 Soldiers are particularly 
vulnerable to HIV infection because of risky sexual behavior. They are 
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often deployed far from wives and family, resulting in a greater propensity 
to hire prostitutes and engage in the types of sexual activity associated with 
high rates of HIV transmission. Also, in many parts of Africa, soldiers are 
viewed as desirable mates because they have steady jobs and a reliable 
income. Thus, the opportunities for soldiers to spread HIV through consen-
sual sex are significant. Soldiers are also vectors in the spread of HIV 
through nonconsensual sex, that is, rape. As has been documented in many 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, war, displacement, and genocide have led to 
the rape of wo.men and girls and their subsequent infection with HIV. In 
Rwanda, the spread of HIV/AIDS among Tutsi women through.rape was an 
intentional part of the genocide.2s 
International Security Threats 
These national security threats emanating from high rates of HIV infection 
are reflected in international security issues as well. Why would the high 
rates of HIV infection be a problem for other states, and why would the 
United States, in particular, be concerned about this issue? Three specific 
issues regarding the spread of HIV represent either a threat to US interests 
or a specific threat to US security: (1) the interest of the United States in 
having African peacekeeping forces available for regional interventions, (2) 
US investment in training African forces abroad in antiterrorism, and (3) the 
threat of failed states. 
Since the invasion of Somalia in 1992, the United States has had an 
explicit preference for regional peacekeeping efforts in Africa rather than 
the deployment of US forces. Accordingly, an attempt has been made to 
train members of African militaries for peacekeeping operations. The most 
prominent of these efforts has been the African Contingency Operations 
Training Assistance program (ACOTA), which built on and expanded the 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program developed by the 
Clinton administration. ACOTA focuses on training African militaries in the 
development of a common peacekeeping doctrine, interoperability, and 
standard communications technology. It seeks thereby to facilitate the effec-
tiveness, coordination, and rapid deployment of African forces in response 
to African humanitarian and security crises. The goal of ACRl/ACOTA is to 
train eight to .ten African battalions of 600 to 800 soldiers, each with addi-
tional specialized companies for combat support.29 Countries receiving 
training and funds though the ACOTA progr~m are expected to deploy their 
troops quickly in response to UN requests for peacekeeping forces, some-
thing in which the United States has an interest. Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, 
Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Cote d'Ivoire have thus far participated in training 
exercises.30 US Army Special Operations officers staff the initial ten-week 
training, which includes computer-simulated exercises. This initial training 
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is followed up by refresher courses. The significant difference between 
ACRI and ACOTA is that the latter includes training and equipment for 
light infantry and small unit operations, which are intended to enable peace-
keeping and peace enforcement in hostile environments. In addition, a 
greater attempt is made to tailor the country programs to the specific needs 
of each country.31 
Yet as HIV/AIDS begins to take its toll on the armed forces, the ability 
of those forces to deploy quickly in response to a threat is impeded. It is 
also less likely that countries in which the armed forces are stretched thin 
due to HIV/AIDS will be willing to participate in peacekeeping operations 
or regional interventions. That was one of the earliest points of concern 
with regard to HIV I AIDS and its effect on international security from the 
perspective of the United States.32 Robert Ostergard has noted that in addi-
tion to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping operations and foreign 
interventions, armed forces may be limited by HIV infection in their ability 
to carry out operations in their own countries.33 
However, the relationship between HIV infection and peacekeeping 
operations is not everywhere problematized. In spite of US concerns 
·about HIV I AIDS negatively affecting the availability of soldiers for 
peacekeeping operations, the relationship between HIV and peacekeeping 
may be fundamentally different. In some African militaries, peacekeep-
ing operations have also served as an incentive for HIV/AIDS prevention 
in Africa. The opportunity of a potentially lucrative and rewarding peace-
keeping assignment is being used as an incentive to encourage HIV pre-
vention in the Ghanaian military.34 The Ghanaian military high command 
encourages HIV prevention and condom use. HIV-positive soldiers are 
forbidden from serving on peacekeeping operations artd miss the prestige 
and extra pay that these assignments bring. According to Brigadier 
General Daniel Twum, "[Soldiers] are aware of this policy and make an 
active personal effort to prevent themselves from catching the virus in 
order to take part in these operations." The Ghanaian military has a lower 
rate of HIV infection than the population at large, which currently has an 
infection rate of 3.8 percent.35 General Twum's statement suggests that 
African peacekeeping assignments may be an incentive for HIV/AIDS 
prevention and should therefore be supported for reasons of both security 
and public health. 
As a consequence, evidence regarding peacekeeping is mixed. It is in 
the interest of US security to have available African peacekeepers, and if 
the Ghanaian case is any example, it also appears to be in the interest of 
African armed forces as well. To the extent that peacekeeping is viewed as a 
coveted assignment, setting high standards for peacekeepers, including 
HIV-negative status, will lead to higher standards across the board for the 
armed forces. It would help if policies mirroring those of the Ghanaian 
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armed forces were implemented in other militaries and received the support 
of countries to which these militaries are deployed. Such receiving coun-
tries may be reluctant to accept African peacekeepers who are HIV-
positive.36 For example, Eritrea has asked that the UN not allow HIV-posi-
tive soldiers to be part of the UN peacekeeping force monitoring the border 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia.37 Such policies raise important human rights 
issues regarding discrimination against those who are HIV-positive and will 
serve to further the stigmatization of HIV-positive people in African coun-
tries. 
The focus on peacekeeping is just a subcategory of the largest type of 
US investment in security in Africa-military-to-military contacts and 
training. The second threat to US interests in Africa from HIV is the 
increased cost of training armed forces in Africa for more traditional opera-
tions. The United States regularly trains African military forces. Some of 
this training is funneled through ACOTA, but more traditional training 
occurs through the International Military Education and Training program 
(IMET), which has existed for decades to train African troops and officers 
at US sites.38 In 2002, IMET trained approximately 1,600 members of 
African armed forces. The countries that have been the largest recipients of 
this training (in dollar amounts) include Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.39 Defense dollars allocated to 
IMET and ACOTA are designed to serve US interests abroad. However, if 
HIV I AIDS is leading to the death, disability, or discharge of soldiers being 
trained via IMET dollars, then the net benefit to the United States in terms 
of security will decrease.40 
IMET training is also linked to the global antiterrorism effort. Since the 
September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has pushed both to strength-
en the ACOTA program to enable it to train soldiers for more "robust" 
assignments than peacekeeping41 and to shift the focus of US military train-
ing to those countries with terrorist threats in order to expand the reach of 
the United States in the struggle against terrorism.42 On March 11, 2002, 
President George W. Bush noted, "We will not send American troops to 
every battle, but America will actively prepare other nations for the battles 
ahead."43 
Thus the status of African armed forces is of critical importance to the 
United States in terms of their ability to participate in peacekeeping and to 
strengthen global antiterrorist efforts. It would be a great asset to African 
militaries and to US national security interests if the United States provided 
antiretroviral drugs to African armed forces as part of the US security strate-
gy in Africa. That would address at least one aspect of the problem of 
HIV I AIDS in African armed forces. If we can assume that those targeted for 
IMET or ACOTA training have already been trained by their own militaries 
and are at least of middle rank and that those selected for IMET and 
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ACOTA training are some of the best and brightest, then the provision of 
antiretroviral drugs would safeguard the investment of US training dollars 
as well as the quality of the command structure of African militaries. 
The third area in which HIV/AIDS presents a threat to US national 
security is its impact on weak states. The armed forces serve as just one 
example of the ways in which a state can be adversely affected by 
HIV/AIDS. The same issues of investment in training and the development 
of a hierarchy are replicated among the ranks of teachers, doctors, nurses, 
politicians, and other educated people. There is a great fear that HIV/AIDS 
will weaken African states and that those weak states will fail. The United 
States and other countries now recognize that state failure in Afghanistan 
provided an environment conducive for terrorists to train and organize their 
attacks against Western targets. Failed states are a threat to global security.44 
The United States therefore has a national security interest in making cer-
tain that state failure is contained so as to make the world a safer place and 
the United States a safer country. September 11 revealed the danger of 
allowing state failures and humanitarian emergencies to go unaddressed. In 
Africa, examples of failed states such as Liberia and Somalia provide ready 
illustrations that this fear has some foundation. Liberian state failure pushed 
the whole Mano River region into war, creating the movement of arms and 
people into nearby countries. Somalia is another African example, and in 
that case state failure has been linked directly to terrorism.45 Thus much of 
the rhetoric coming from US government officials regarding HIV/AIDS in 
Africa and national security uses state failure as the critical link between 
these two issues.46 In the section below, I examine the recent US response 
to that threat. 
The Bush Administration and Global HIV/AIDS 
The Bush administration embraced the HIV/AIDS threat as both a human 
and a national security issue. In a 2002 speech, Colin Powell stated: 
AIDS is not just a compelling moral issue; it is not just a humanitarian 
issue; it is far more than just a health issue. It is a security issue. It is a 
destroyer of nations. It is a destroyer of societies. It has the potential to 
destabilize regions, perhaps even entire continents. It can tear the social 
fabric apart within any nation. It can rob young democracies of citizens 
they need to build freer, better futures for themselves and for their chil-
dren. HIV/AIDS is an economic issue, leaving nations without human 
resources to grow and develop, ultimately sapping global well-being.47 
The desire to take some sort of national action on an issue that was 
increasingly articulated as a humanitarian disaster as well as a national 
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security threat led to the announcement of a new bill to fight global 
HIV/AIDS. It was called the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR). The announcement was first made in the 2002 State of the 
Union address. President Bush promised $15 billion over a five-year peri-
od to fight AIDS, or $3 billion per year, a sum that would have been a 
huge increase over previous funding levels. After appropriations, that 
number was substantially reduced, yet the final contribution remained sig-
nificant. 48 In fiscal year 1995, the US government gave $127 million to 
international HIV/AIDS programs. In fiscal year 2005, that allocation 
reached $2.2 billion. The percentage of discretionary US government 
AIDS funding going to international programs has increased from 3 per-
cent in 1996 to 22 percent in 2004.49 Figure 7.1 depicts the increase. 
In the PEPFAR legislation, international security issues are noted as 
one of the pressing concerns justifying the extraordinary commitment of US 
funds to fighting HIV/AIDS internationally: 
(J) 
c 
.Q 
~ 
HIV/AIDS weakens the defenses of countries severely affected by the 
HIV/AIDS crisis through high infection rates among members of their mil-
itary forces and voluntary peacekeeping personnel. According to 
Figure 7.1 Federal Funding for International HIV/AIDS, 
FYs 1995-2004 (excluding international research; US$ millions) 
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HIV I AIDS-Fiscal Years 1981-2004," Chart Pack, publication number 7032, www.kff.org. 
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UNAIDS, in sub-Saharan Africa, many military forces have infection rates 
as much as five times that of the civilian population. HIV/AIDS poses a 
serious security issue for the international community by increasing the 
potential for political instability and economic devastation, particularly in 
those countries and regions most severely affected by the disease; decreas-
ing the capacity to resolve conflicts through the introduction of peacekeep-
ing forces because the environments into which these forces are intro-
duced pose a high risk for the spread of HIV/AIDS; and increasing the 
vulnerability of local populations to HIV/AIDS in conflict zones from 
peacekeeping troops with HIV infection rates significantly higher than 
civilian populations.SO 
Though it might be overstated, the US government takes the security threat 
noted in the PEPFAR legislation seriously, and it has put HIV/AIDS on the US 
agenda in terms of both security and the commitment of funds. Yet only twelve 
African countries are covered by the PEPFAR legislation: Botswana, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Others are left out for reasons that 
have not been made clear. Moreover, other countries at risk from the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, most notably India, are not currently targeted for funding. 
The substantial new funding represented by PEPFAR will affect human 
security, even though the effort is motivated by national security.SI PEPFAR 
legislation represents a different form of engagement than has previously 
been present between the United States and Africa. The United States has 
not previously dedicated so many resources to fighting a disease overseas, 
nor has a disease been portrayed as a national security threat. In fact, AIDS 
has been killing Africans in large numbers for fifteen years with little US 
regard for its effects beyond the NGO level. However, the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, changed the way the US security establishment con-
ceives of US interests. In the general reconceptualization of security, Africa 
became far more important than it had been in the immediate post-Cold 
War era, largely because of the threat of failed states. 
US National Security and Public Health in Africa 
Whatever the motivation for US concern with AIDS in Africa, the flow of 
money to the continent to assist with the crisis being caused by AIDS deaths 
and HIV infections will be welcomed. The question must be asked, Will this 
money serve the goal of strengthening weak African states and bolstering 
US security interests? If.past foreign aid targeted at public health and edu-
cation is any example, the answer is no. If the United States pours money 
into African states to strengthen their public health systems over a five-year 
period, possibly African states will respond by withdrawing national fund-
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ing in the areas where foreign funds are coming in. To some degree that 
makes sense: Why should states allocate scarce resources to areas that are 
already receiving funding? In the past, NGO involvement in Africa has 
resulted in states abdicating their responsibility to provide basic education 
and health care to their citizenry.52 The ironic effect is that when states stop 
providing these basic public goods, they grow weaker, despite the underly-
ing intent of this funding initiative to strengthen African capabilities. 
In addition, the timing of the PEPFAR legislation and its long-term 
effects also give cause for concern. In the first year of funding, the US gov-
ernment requested less than $3 billion because of a stated desire to see the 
infrastructure in place through which the aid can be funneled. The bill states 
that 55 percent of the money allocated by the PEPFAR legislation would go 
toward the purchase of antiretroviral drugs. That is good news indeed: with 
treatment, HIV infection can change from a death sentence to a serious but 
chronic disease. But when the five years of funding runs out, will Africans 
just return to the business of dying?53 
Additionally, it is unclear to what extent African governments see 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat. Certainly, good reason exists for them to do 
so. Yet for them, HIV/AIDS is also much more than a security threat. It is a 
public health disaster that drains from state coffers precious funds needed to 
combat even more pervasive diseases such as malaria. It is a drain on the 
educational system and burdens the state with large numbers of orphans to 
care for (or not to care for and then suffer the consequences). Moreover, 
HIV/AIDS affects the efficiency of a country's workforce. One HIV-testing 
project in Tanzania indicated that HIV I AIDS is the dominant cause of lost 
labor productivity and thus has an impact on company revenue.54 
HIV/AIDS also affects the efficiency of labor, when even those who are not 
HIV-positive are obligated to care for the dying or to participate in frequent 
funerals and ritualized memorials for those that have died. 
The US focus on HIV/AIDS as a security issue could be a boon for 
African governments struggling with their response to overwhelming num-
bers of HIV-positive citizens. Yet US and African perspectives seem to 
diverge as African states struggle with more than just the security elements 
of the AIDS pandemic. The burdens that structural adjustment places on 
countries should also be noted. Although the US policy of support for com-
bating the HIV/AIDS pandemic is laudable, it coexists with US support for 
structural adjustment programs that promote fee-based health care and pri-
mary education. Some evidence links structural adjustment with the spread 
of HIV/AIDS in Kenya, where the imposition of fees led to a decline in 
attendance at clinics.55 With growing numbers of AIDS orphans and fami-
lies impoverished by multiple AIDS deaths, the US support of fee-based 
services puts these basic public goods out of the reach of those the United 
States is trying to assist through targeted HIV/AIDS funding. 
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Conclusion 
Security threats emanating from the HIV/AIDS pandemic are played out in 
an African context in which there are few ongoing international conflicts 
and the primary goal of most states is development. In those countries with 
high infection rates, HIV/AIDS has impeded overall development and low-
ered life expectancies significantly. It is important to recognize, however, 
that the HIV I AIDS pandemic does not affect every country in Africa in a 
similar fashion. Infection rates are substantially greater in southern Africa 
and East Africa than in West and North Africa. 
US interests regarding HIV/AIDS in Africa have evolved over time, from 
exclusively humanitarian interests to those of international security. PEPFAR 
is a short-term measure that will ameliorate but not eliminate, the threat of 
failed states in Africa. Although it is laudable that the United States is active 
in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, comprehensive programs, far beyond 
the reach of those suggested by the PEPFAR legislation, will be needed to 
establish long-term, sustainable HIV/AIDS prevention programs. Even with 
comprehensive long-term educational and health care programs, the task has 
only begun, for by many assessments Africa is not the only continent that will 
experience the ravages of the AIDS epidemic. The next wave of increasing 
HIV infections and AIDS deaths is expected to play out in Asia, particularly 
on the Indian subcontinent. There, the security implications of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic will be magnified, as the issues of HIV infection within the armed 
forces and the weakening of the state develop in a context of the India-
Pakistan conflict, the arms race, and the delicate situation in Kashmir. 
Appendix: HIV Prevalence Rates, 2003 
Country 
Southern Africa 
Swaziland 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Zimbabwe 
South Africa 
Namibia 
Zambia 
HIV/AIDS Prevalence 
Among Individuals 
15-49 Years Old, General 
Population (percentage) 
38.8 
37.3 
28.9 
24.6 
21.5 
21.3 
16.5 
HIV I AIDS Prevalence, 
Military Population 
(percentage) 
50 
60--70 
(continues) 
Appendix, continued 
Country 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Angola 
East Africa 
HIV I AIDS Prevalence 
Among Individuals 
15-49 Years Old, General 
Population (percentage) 
14.2 
12.2 
3.9 
United Republic of Tanzania 8.8 
Kenya 6.7 
Burundi a 6.0 
Rwanda 5.1 
Ethiopia 4.4 
Uganda 4.1 
Djibouti 2.9 
Eritrea 2.7 
Sudan 2.3 
Somalia a 1.0 
Central Africa 
Central African Republic 13.5 
Gabon 8.1 
Cameroon 6.9 
Congo 4.9 
Chad 4.8 
Democratic Republic of Congo 4.2 
Equatorial Guineaa 3.4 
West Africa 
Cote d'Ivoire 7.0 
Sierra Leonea 7.0 
Liberia 5.9 
Nigeria 5.4 
Burkina Faso 4.2 
Togo 4.1 
Guinea 3.2 
Ghana 3.1 
Guinea-Bissau a 2.8 
Benin 1.9 
Mali 1.9 
Gambia 1.2 
Niger 1.2 
Senegal 0.8 
Mauritania 0.4 
HIV I AIDS Prevalence, 
Military Population 
(percentage) 
40-60 
15-30 
10 
10-25 
40-60 
10-20 
61b 
10-20 
Sources:.Radhika Sarin, "A New Security Threat: HIV/AIDS in the Military," World Watch 
16, no. 2 (March-April 2003): 16-22; Doctors for Life, "AIDS Statistics," Doctors for Life 
Living Safely AIDS Projects, December 2000; Stefan Elbe, "HIV/AIDS and the Changing 
Landscape of War in Africa," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002): 159-177; Kevin O'Brian, 
"AIDS and African Armies," Atlantic Monthly 292, no. 1 (July 2003): 86-87; UNAIDS, "Table 
of Country-Specific HIV/AIDS Estimates and Data, End 2003," 2004 Report on the Global 
AIDS Epidemic, July 2004, www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/report_pdf.html. These numbers of' 
HIV-infected people were calculated as a percentage of the population given by UNDP for 2003. 
Notes: a. 2001 figures. 
b. 1998 figure. 
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